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1. Introduction
This work is meant to contribute to the analysis of organisations as repositories of problem-solving
knowledge and of the ways the latter co-evolves with governance arrangements. These themes find
their roots in at least four complementary streams of literature, namely, first, the studies – of
"Simonian" ascendancy – of problem-solving activities, and of the structure of knowledge they
entail (cf. Simon, 1981); second, diverse investigations on comparative performance of diverse
organisational architectures and related patterns of distribution of information and division of labour
(cf. Radner, 1992 and Aoki, 1988); third, evolutionary theories of the firm, in particular with their
emphasis on the knowledge content of organisational routines (Nelson and Winter, 1982, Cohen et
al., 1996); fourth, and largely overlapping, competence-based views of the firm (Winter, 1988, Dosi,
Nelson and Winter, 2000).
Broadly in tune both with analyses of organisations, mainly inspired by Herbert Simon, as sort of
imperfect problem-solving arrangements as well as a good deal of evolutionary theories of the firm,
we censor in a first approximation any explicit incentive compatibility issue among organisational
members. Rather, we focus upon the ways different patterns of division of labour shape and
constrain search processes in high dimensional problem spaces. Examples of such search processes
are all those problems requiring the coordination of a large number of interdependent "elements"
whose functional relationships are, to a good degree, opaque to the organisational members
themselves
1.
Here by "elements" we mean elementary physical acts – such as moving one piece of iron from
one place to another – and elementary cognitive acts – such as applying inference rules. Relatedly,
problem-solving can be straightforwardly understood as combination of elementary acts leading to a
feasible outcome (e.g. the design and production of an engine, the discovery and testing of a
chemical compound, etc.).
In this perspective, we present a quite general formal framework enabling the exploration of the
problem-solving properties of diverse patterns of division of labour and routine-clustering practices,
ranging over a continuum that notionally spans from totally decentralised market-like mechanisms
to fully decentralised coordination processes. Not surprisingly, the complexity of the problem-
solving tasks bears upon the performance outcomes of different organisational arrangements. In a
broad and somewhat impressionistic definition, which we shall refine below, by  “complex
problems” we denote high dimensional problems whose solution requires the coordination of
interdependent components whose functional relations are only partly understood. Designing a
                                                          
1 By that censorship of the double nature of organisations as both problem-solvers and mechanisms of governance of
potentially conflicting interests we clearly fall short of the "grand research program" sketched in Coriat and Dosi (1998)
whereby evolutionary and competence-based theories of the firm begin to take on board incentive alignment issues. In
the present "first approximation", however, we feel well justified by the still rudimentary state of knowledge-centred
investigations of organisational arrangements, especially when compared with nearly pathological theoretical
refinements on hyper-rational incentive compatible schemes that no one will ever observe on earth.3
complex artefact, establishing a sequence of moves in a game or designing a multi-agent
organisational structure are all instances of "complex problems''.
Consider the case of designing an aircraft. This will require the coordination of a large number of
different elements such as engine type and power, wing size and shape, materials used, etc. whose
interactions have to be tested through simulations, prototype building and maybe some other forms
of trial and error processes. At the end, an “effective” solution to the problem (i.e. a properly flying
aircraft) will be one in which a large set of traits and characteristics have been coordinated in ways
which turn out to be compatible with each other. Note that, for instance, adding a more powerful
engine might imply a decreasing overall performance if other components (wings, etc.) are not
properly adjusted and tuned with that change. Playing chess is not too different a case: a winning
solution is a long sequence of moves each of which is chosen out of a set of possibilities large
enough to make an extensive search unfeasible for any boundedly rational agent. Even in this case,
the key point is the opaqueness of the relations among such moves in the sequence (a notionally
optimal strategy might involve, for instance, castling at a given time of the game but the same
castling, as a part of some sub-optimal, but otherwise effective, strategy, could turn out to be a
losing move...).
Organisations such as business firms generally face a similar class of problems. Indeed, they can
be represented as complex multi-dimensional bundles of routines, decision rules, procedures,
incentive schemes whose interplay can be hardly assumed to be perfectly known also to those who
manage the very same organisation (witness all the problems, unforeseen consequences and
unexpected feed-backs emerging whenever managers try to promote organisational changes: cf.
March and Simon (1993) for a classic treatment of the subject). So, for example, introducing some
routines, practices, or incentive schemes which have proven superior in another organisational
context, could prove harmful in a context where other elements are not appropriately tuned (more
on this issue, from different angles, in the chapters by Fujimoto, Coriat and Levinthal in Dosi,
Nelson and Winter (2000)).
The main underlying issue is that functional relations among components (e.g. elementary
cognitive and practical acts) are only partly understood while the contribution of each of the
component to the overall solution depends, to various degrees, on the state assumed by other
components: hence the need to explore a large combinatorial space of components possibly by a
trial and error process. At the same time, these very characteristics of problem-solving search tend
to jeopardise a fruitful use of global information - i.e. information which derives from some global
performance measurement – for "good" adjustments at a local level.
The problem here is the one of whether and under what conditions it is possible to achieve
optimal or nearly optimal solutions through small local and incremental adjustments. This problem
has long interested especially computer scientists (all search algorithms face this kind of problems)
and biologists (the very small rates of mutation observed in the biological realm can justify models
of evolution whereby only one gene at a time gets mutated). Biologists in particular have produced
some easy and highly suggestive models (see in particular Kauffman's "NK model" of fitness4
landscapes, cf. Kauffman (1993)) which show that if the entities subject to evolutionary selection
pressure are somewhat "complex" entities, i.e. made up of many non-linearly interacting
components, then local incremental search combined with selection generally to highly sub-optimal
and path-dependent evolutionary paths. These biological models seem to have many relevant
implications also when the "complex" entities under scrutiny are social organisations such as
business firm (cf. Levinthal (1997)).
This paper can be considered as a generalisation of Kauffman's argument as it presents a model
which determines the extent to which a problem space can be decomposed into smaller sub-
problems which can be solved independently or quasi independently without affecting (or affecting
only within given limits) the possibility of finding optimal or at least good solutions.
In the following, we shall first introduce some technical notions on problem-solving and
organisations as problem-solving arrangements (section 2). Section 3 presents our basic model and
discusses a few of its generic properties, while section 4 provides some examples of different
decomposition schemes and related solution patterns. Finally, in section 5 we draw the main
conclusions and outline some possible directions for further research.
2. On the nature of organisational problem-solving: some introductory notes
In problems whose solution involves the exploration of high dimensional spaces, agents endowed
with limited computational capabilities and with a limited knowledge of the interdependencies can
explore only a subset, possibly very small, of solutions. Even if we assume that the selection
mechanism which selects among alternative solution works perfectly (i.e. without delays, inertia,
errors or "transaction costs" as economists would say), the outcome of selection is bound by the set
of solutions which are produced by the generative mechanism. It may well be the case that optimal
or even “good” solutions will never be generated at all and thus that they will never be selected by
any selection mechanism whatsoever.
The problem here is that strong interdependencies create a large set of local optima in the search
space. Marginal contributions rapidly switch from positive to negative values, depending on which
value is assumed by other components. As a consequence, the presence of strong interdependencies
prevents the possibility of reaching optimal solutions by simply adopting an optimal value for each
of the components a problem is made of. It is thus possible that, given a n-dimensional problem
whose current state is a1, …, an and whose optimal solution is a*1, …, a*n  some or even all of the
solutions of the form a1, … a*i,… an have a worse performance than the currently adopted one. Also
note that if each of the ai's was traded on a competitive market with prices reflecting their revealed
productivity, notionally superior resources a*i would never be hired as their marginal productivity is
negative. As a consequence - that we will largely expand upon in the following sections - it might
well be the case that the optimal solution will never be generated and thus never selected.5
The issue of interdependencies and of how they shape search processes in a space of solutions is
also faced in Kauffman’s NK model of selection dynamics in biological domains with
heterogeneous interdependent traits.
NK models the evolution of systems composed of a number of elements which locally and
interdependently contribute to the global features of the system they collectively constitute. The
model was originally intended to capture the evolutionary dynamics of organisms (i.e. systems) as
described by sets of genes (i.e. elements). The formal structure of the model and the idea behind it,
are however general enough to allow its application to realms and domains different from molecular
biology (cf. Levinthal (1997), Westhoff et al. (1996)).
In NK’s terminology, a system is described by a string composed of different loci each referring
to one of the elements that compose the system. In the aforementioned aircraft example, for
instance, we might well imagine the aircraft represented by a string in which each locus refers to
one of the aircraft elements (i.e. wings, engine, body…).
The whole thing can be shortly explained by referring to the N and the K in the name of the
model.
The N in the name NK refers to the number of elements or loci one is considering, that is: to the
dimension of the problem at hand. Each element can assume one out of a set of different states
(called alleles in biology). That is: each element can be assigned a value representing, for instance, a
specific feature being present or not or, which specific shape or feature one chooses for a given
element. The number of possible strings (i.e. of different configurations a system can be in) is called
the possibility space of a system.
The K, on the other hand, refers to the number of interdependencies between different elements.
These are usually called epistatic correlations and they do describe the inner structure of the system
in terms of the number of elements that each locus is interdependent with. In particular, K describes
how the contribution of each element to the system is dependent not only on its own value, but on
other elements’ values as well. A system whose K value is 2, for instance, is a system in which each
element contribution is dependent on the values assumed by two other elements. The two limit cases
are that of K being equal to 0 (i.e. each element contribution is solely dependent on its own state and
there are no interdependencies in the system) and that of K being equal to N-1 (i.e. each element
contribution is dependent on the state assumed by every other element in the system).
We can then easily imagine that each state assumed by a system (i.e. each assignment of values
to its elements) is assigned a measure of, say, effectiveness with respect to a given task; let us call
this a fitness measure. Now, the distribution of fitness values of all possible states is called a fitness
landscape. A fitness landscape is thus a way of mapping a system’ states onto their relative fitness
values and it constitutes a representation of a possibility space along with the fitness values of each
possible string in it.
The point we’ll be interested in is the exploration of  a fitness landscape, that is: the search for
better (i.e. fitter) configurations in the space of all possible configurations.6
Given that a system’s actual configuration is a string in which every locus has been assigned a
value, the way to explore a landscape and to test the fitness values of other configurations
corresponds to changing some elements’ values thus moving from one configuration to a new one
and, consequently, from one point of the landscape to a new (and possibly higher) one.
The value assumed by K is a key point with respect to the shape of a fitness landscape and,
consequently, to its exploration. Indeed, being K=0 the contribution of each element to overall
fitness will be independent from every other element and, consequently, a change in a single
element’s value will leave unchanged the contribution of all the other N-1 elements. It then follows
that the whole landscape will look very “smooth” and configurations that are similar with respect to
values assumed by their elements will also have similar fitness values. The highly correlated
structure of the fitness landscape can be effectively exploited by local and incremental search
processes. On the contrary, as K increases the landscape will be increasingly rugged and points that
are close in the landscape will no longer have similar fitness values.
What is most relevant to our point is the fact that the more a landscape is rugged the less (locally)
informative is its exploration and the less is the degree of “correlatedness” of different
configurations.
However, Kauffman's approach to the exploration of a fitness landscape does not necessarily fits
well with the realm of social evolution. The main reason for this inadequacy is that social actors
might well explore a fitness landscape by the application of a far richer class of algorithms than one-
bit mutational ones studied by Kauffman and grounded on the laws of genetics. Actually, a social
agent (be it an individual or an organisation) can possibly adopt many kinds of problem solving
strategy and search algorithms of virtually any cardinality. The very notion of locality and
neighbourhood search is not clearly defined in social realms but is itself a product of how
individuals and organisations represent the problems they try to solve.
The relevance of this point will be made evident by the following considerations. The notion of
fitness landscape is indeed centred upon two ideas: a function that assigns a fitness value to each
element of the space of configurations and a metric defined in that space which reflects a measure of
distance between two different configurations. Once an algorithm is defined that transforms a
configuration into another one, the notion of distance between two configurations is defined as the
minimum number of applications of the algorithm needed in order to transform a configuration into
the other. In this way the set of neighbours of a configuration is defined in terms of what can be
reached from it. In the case of mutational algorithms of cardinality one, the set of neighbours of a
configuration is defined as the set of configurations that are a single step away from it
2. It is then
evident that a change in the search algorithm will result in a change in the geometry of the
landscape: a landscape might be extremely rugged when defined on one-bit mutations but very
smooth when defined on mutations of higher cardinality.
                                                          
2 “Single step” is a naive formulation of the notion of unitary Hamming distance. Hamming distance denotes the number
of loci at which corresponding bits take on different values.7
We have thus considered possible ways of exploring a fitness landscape other and more general
than single-bit mutations. In particular, following Simon (1981), our focus is on those problem
solving strategies which decompose a large problem into a set of smaller sub-problems that can be
treated independently, by promoting what might be called a division of problem solving labour.
Imagine, for instance, a N-dimensional problem: i.e. a problem which is composed of N different
bits or traits.  A one-bit mutational algorithm correspond to a maximally decentralized
decomposition in which each of the N bits will be given a value independently of all the other N-1
bits. In this sense the whole problem will be decomposed into the smallest possible sub-problems.
This search strategy is a potentially very quick one as it will require at most nN steps, given that
each of the N components can be in one out of n possible states. Unfortunately, as already hinted
and as showed by Kauffman, the existence of interdependencies among components will prevent the
system to reach the global optimum (i.e. the optimal solution) but only the local optimum whose
basin of attraction contains the initial configuration of the problem. On the other hand, the same
problem could be left totally undecomposed and a search algorithm might be adopted which
explores all the N dimensions of the problem. This strategy corresponds to mutating up to all the N
components of the problem and it leads with certainty to the global optimum by examining all the
n
N possible configurations. In between there are all the other possible decomposition of the
problem, each corresponding to a different division of labour.
According to this view, the division of problem solving labour to a large extent determines which
solutions will be possible to generate and then select. As we have suggested, decompositions are
necessary in order to reduce the dimension of the search space, but, at the very same time, they also
constrain search processes to a specific sub-space of possible solutions thus making it possible for
optimal solutions not to be ever generated and for systems to be locked into sub-optimal solutions.
We thus believe that our arguments cast some serious doubts on any view of markets relying on a
“optimality-through-selection” assumption or on any view which assumes market forces as capable
of substituting individual rationality with evolutionary optimisation. At the same time, our route to
the analysis of organisational forms, is in some important respects the symmetric opposite to the one
explored by a good deal of contemporary accounts of agency problems, focussing, as they do, on the
identification of efficient incentive mechanisms for coordination on the implicit but momentous
assumption that optimal problem solving governance structures and optimal search heuristics are
naturally in place from the outset.
Of course, only a planner who has perfect knowledge of all the interdependencies, a Laplacian
God for instance, could implement a perfect set of signals and incentives mechanisms. Limiting
ourselves to more earthly and Simonian rather than Laplacian situations, we investigate the case of
boundedly rational and computationally limited problem solvers who are forced to decompose
problems which are not fully decomposable by separating only the more “fitness-relevant”
interdependencies, while other still persist across subproblems. By separating interdependent
elements into different sub-problems, a problem whose complexity is far beyond available
computational resources is reduced to smaller subproblems which can be handled, ruling away in8
any case the possibility of reaching with certainty the optimal solution. According to this softening
of the requirements on decompositions' grain, we will show how “near-decompositions” can be
constructed which, when considered as satisficing rather than optimal structures, can significantly
improve search times and attain a higher degree of decentralization at the expenses of optimality of
the solutions. In order to study some evolutionary properties of populations of agents endowed with
different decompositions of the same problem, we also run a class of simulations, whose results will
be presented and discussed in section 4.
Our last point is concerned with representational issues related with problem solving. Up to now,
we have only considered that a problem representation is exogenously given to agents. Actually,
amore cognition-oriented perspective might be adopted that amounts to considering how agents
trying to solving a problem can derive much of their possibilities of success from the adoption of
different and subjective perceptions of the very same problem. A reasonable hypothesis is that
agents' search might well take place not on the “objective” landscape, but in a space constructed as a
subjective representation of it. In this sense, changing representations might turn out to be an even
more powerful problem solving strategy than decomposition.
According to this more cognitive-oriented view, we imagine agents' representations of a problem
to be actually grounded on the objective landscape but, notwithstanding that, to be a simplified
version of it (possibly of lower dimensionality). As noted by Gavetti and Levinthal (2000),
cognitive representations tend to be simplified caricatures of the actual landscape as a result of their
lower (perceived) dimensionality which, in turn, also results in a reduction of its apparent
(perceived) degree of connectivity. In particular, we show that both acting on the encoding of a
problem and on the ordering relation on solutions, every problem can be transformed in one of
minimal complexity.
One of the fundamental aspects of problem solving procedures concerns representations of the
problems itself. As a couple of us argued in more detail elsewhere (Dosi, Marengo and Fagiolo
(2000)) – well in tune with a vast literature from cognitive science – a crucial step concerns the very
processes through which individual agents and structured collectives of them i.e. organisations
interpret the environment wherein they operate by means of inevitably imperfect and possibly fuzzy
cognitive categories, causal links amongst environmental variables, conjectures on action/payoff
relations, etc..
In the language of the analysis below, all this is captured through subjective decompositions and
thus also subjective landscapes of problem solving search which might only bear vague similarities
(if at all) with the “true” structure of the problem – as a God-like observer would be able to see it.
Indeed section 3 that follows largely takes the latter God-like perspective in order to identify some
general characteristics of problem solving, in terms of e.g. task decomposability, dimensionality of
search spaces, attainability of optimal solutions, properties of search landscape, speed of
convergence. In section 4 we begin to progressively “come down to earth” and account for
systematic gaps between subjective and “true” (God-like) representations of the search landscapes.9
An important intermediate step of the analysis focuses upon problem-solving set-ups
characterised by cognitively bounded representations which nonetheless maintain some
isomorphism with the “objective” search landscape. Broadly in line with Gavetti and Levinthal
(2000), we begin by assuming agents’ representations of a problem to be grounded on the “true”
landscape, although as a simplified version of it, of lower dimensionality, entailing also a reduction
of its perceived degree of connectivity amongst subproblems/elementary tasks.
The subsequent and even more difficult analytical challenge ought to push much further the
exploration of systematic gaps between actual representations/search landscapes for both
individuals and organisations, on the one hand, and this God-like nature. Some conjectures are put
forward in section 5. Remarkably, our model shows that, with striking generality, operating on both
the encoding of a problem and on the ordering relation on solutions, every problem can be
transformed into one of minimal complexity. In a profound sense, the degrees of complexity of any
problem are in the minds of the beholders. All that however implies stringent demands for the
theorist in its descriptive mode to be disciplined by empirical evidence on the nature of cognitive
structures, learning processes, patterns of organisational coordination etc.
3. The Basic Model: Problem Representation, Decomposition and Coordination
3.1 Basic definitions.
Let us assume that the solution of any given problem requires the coordination of  N atomic
elements, which we call generically components, each of which can assume a number of alternative
states. For simplicity, we assume that each element can assume only two states, labelled 0 and 1.
Note that all the procedures and results presented below can be very easily extended to the case of
any finite number of states and also, with some complications, of numerable alternative states.
Introducing some notation, we characterise a problem by the following elements:
The set of components: S={s1,s2,.....,sN}, where si˛{0,1}
A configuration or possible solution to the problem is a string xi =s1s2.....sN
The set of possible configurations: X={x1,x2,.....,xp} where p=2
N
An ordering ‡ over the set of possible configurations
3: we write xi‡xj whenever xi is (weakly)
preferred to xj. For simplicity we assume that ‡ is anti-symmetric, i.e. that x‡y and y‡x implies x=y
(this assumption will be dropped later on.)
Thus, a problem is defined by the couple (X, ‡).
As the size of the set of configurations is exponential in the number of components, whenever
the latter is relatively large, the state space of the search problem becomes too vast to be
                                                          
3 Of course such an ordering could be substituted, where applicable, by a real-valued fitness function F:Xﬁ￿.10
extensively searched by agents with bounded computational capabilities. One way of reducing its
size it to decompose it into sub-spaces:
Let I={1,2,3,.......,N} be the set of indexes, and let a block d ˝ I be a non-empty subset of it, and
let |d| be the size of the block d, (i.e. its cardinality).
In what follows, we shall confine ourselves to a particular class of search algorithms. Given that
a search algorithm is a map which transforms a state into another according to some preliminary
encoding (i.e. S: L ￿   L), we shall consider algorithms which are:
a) climbing: (i.e. they move from a state to another if and only if this has a higher evaluation):
S(x) = x*  iff  x* ‡ x
S(x) = x otherwise.
b) mutational: (i.e. they can be characterised in terms of sets of bits they can mutate). So, given
our index set I = {1, 2,..., N}, every such algorithm can be characterised by the subset of such
positions it can mutate, that is: d ˛ {2
I \˘}. According to this view, the size |d| of an algorithm can
be imagined to be the number of bits it can mutate (i.e. the cardinality of its defining subset of
indexes.)
We define a decomposition scheme (or simply decomposition) of the set X as a set of blocks:






A decomposition scheme is therefore a decomposition of the  N dimensional space of
configurations into sub-spaces of smaller dimension, whose union returns the entire problem (but
they do not necessarily form a partition of it).
Given a configuration x j and a block d k, we call block-configuration x j(dk) the substring of
length |dk| containing the components of configuration xj belonging to block dk :
k i k k k k j d k s s s d x
k d ˛ =    all for       .... ) (
| | 2 1
We also use the notation x j(d-k) to indicate the substring of length  N-|dk| containing the
components of configuration xj not belonging to block dk :
k i k k k k j d k s s s d x
k d N ˇ =
- -    all for       .... ) (
| | 2 1
We can thus indicate the configuration xj also by using the notation xj(dk)￿xj(d-k)
We define the size of a decomposition scheme as the size of its largest defining block:
sz(D) = max {|d1|,|d2|,....,|dk|}
A decomposition scheme and its size are important indicators of the complexity of the algorithm
which is being employed to solve a problem:
1) a problem decomposed according to the scheme D={{1},{2},{3},.....,{N}} has been reduced
to the union of sub-problems of minimum complexity, while a problem which has not been
decomposed, i.e. whose decomposition scheme is D={{1,2,3,....., N}}, is a problem of maximum
complexity because it can only be searched extensively (i.e. intuitively, there is no local feedback
for search);11
2) a problem which has been decomposed according to the scheme D={{1},{2},{3},.....,{N}} is
being solved in linear time (in N steps), while a problem which has not been decomposed can only
be solved in exponential time (in 2
N steps);
3) on the other hand, a problem which has not been decomposed can always been solved
optimally (though in exponential time) while, as it will be shown below, a problem which has been
decomposed according to the scheme D={{1},{2},{3},.....,{N}} - or for that matter according to any
scheme whose size is smaller than N – can be solved optimally only under some special path-
dependent conditions (which, as we will show, become more and more restrictive as the size of the
decomposition scheme decreases).
Thus there is a trade-off between complexity and optimality for which we will provide a precise
measure in the following.
For sake of theoretical simplicity, assume that coordination among blocks in a decomposition
scheme takes place through decentralised market-like selection mechanisms which select at no cost
and without any friction over alternative block-configurations.
In particular, assume that the current configuration is xj and take block dk with its current block-
configuration xj(dk). Consider now a new block-configuration xh(dk)„xj(dk), if:
xh(dk)￿xj(d-k)‡ xj(dk)￿xj(d-k)
then xh(dk) is selected and the new configuration xh(dk)￿xj(d-k) is retained in the place of
xj, otherwise xh(dk)￿xj(d-k) is discarded and xj is retained.
It might help to think in terms of a given structure of division of labour (the decomposition
scheme), with firms or workers specialised in the various segments of the production process (a
single block) and competing in a market which selects those firms or workers whose characteristics
give the highest contribution to the overall production process.
On the other hand the coordination of components held together in a block has an implicit cost,
in terms of search speed growing exponentially, with the size of the block.
We can now analyse the properties of decomposition schemes in terms of their capacities to
generate and select better configurations.
3.2 Selection and search paths.
A decomposition scheme is a sort of template which determines how new configurations are
generated and tested. In large search spaces in which only a very small subset of all possible
configurations can be tested, the procedure employed to generate such new configurations plays a
key role in defining the set of attainable final configurations.
We will assume that boundedly rational agents can only search locally in directions which are
given by the decomposition scheme: new configurations are generated and tested in the
neighbourhood of the given one, where neighbours are new configurations obtained by changing
some (possibly all) components within a given block.12
Given a decomposition scheme D={d1,d2,…. ,di,...,dk}, we define, following Marengo (1999):
A configuration x






2) sv=zv if vˇdh
i.e. the two configurations can differ only by components which belong to the block dk.
According to the definition, a neighbour can be reached from a given configuration through the
operation of a single elementary environment (i.e. a single “market”).
We call Hi(x, di) the set of neighbours of a configuration x for block di.
The
4  best neighbour
5 B i(x, d i) of a configuration  x for block d i is the most preferred
configuration in the set of neighbours:
Bi(x, di) = y˛Hi(x, di) such that y‡z for every z˛Hi(x, di)
A configuration x is a local optimum for block dk if Hi(x, dh)=˘
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=  is the set of neighbours of configuration x for decomposition scheme D
A configuration x is a local optimum for the decomposition scheme D if H(x,D) =˘
A ( search-)  path P(x
d,D) from a configuration  x
d and for a decomposition scheme D is a









A configuration y is reachable from another configuration x and for decomposition D if there
exist a P(x,D) such that y˛P(x,D)
Suppose configuration x
0 is a local optimum for decomposition D, we call basin of attraction
Y(x
0,D) of x
0 for decomposition D the set of all configurations from which x
0 is reachable:
Y(x
0,D)={y such that $P(y,D) with x
0˛ P(y,D)}
                                                          
4 The assumption that ‡ be anti-symmetric guarantees the uniqueness of the best neighbour.
5 A special case is when a block-configuration is always a best neighbour for any starting configuration. This case is
called dominance of a block configuration and is examined by Page (1996).13
A best-neighbour-path F(x
d,D) from a configuration x
d and for a decomposition scheme D is a
sequence, starting from x







i-1,dh)  for dh˛D
Proposition 1: if x
0 is a local optimum for decomposition D and it is reachable from x
i, then




Proposition 1 states that reachability of local optima can be analysed by referring only to best-
neighbour paths. This greatly reduces the set of paths one has to test in order to check for
reachability. It is worth emphasising however that the result is fundamental for the God like analysis
of the objective problem solving structure but must not be taken as saying much about problem-
solving complexity by any cognitively bounded agent.
The following proposition establishes a rather obvious but important property of decomposition
schemes: as one climbs within the basin of attraction of a local optimum, finer decomposition
schemes can usually be introduced which allow to reach the same local optimum.
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d} for 0<i£d. Then if D „{{1},{2},{3},.....,{N}} there
exist an i such that for Y
i(x
0,D) a decomposition D¢„D can be found with sz(D¢)<sz(D).
Proof: cf. Appendix
Among all the (possibly many) decomposition schemes of a given problem, one is  obviously
interested in those whereby the global optimum becomes reachable from any starting configuration.
One such decomposition always exist, and is the degenerate decomposition D={{1,2,3,....., N}} for
which of course there exist only one local optimum and it coincides with the global one. But one is
equally interested in smaller decompositions – if they exist – and in particular in those of minimum
size. The latter decompositions represent the maximum extent to which problem-solving can be
subdivided into independent sub-problems coordinated by decentralised selection, with the further
requirement that such selection processes can eventually lead to optimality from any starting
condition. Note that, finer decompositions do not in general (unless the starting configuration is “by
luck” within the basin of attraction of the global optimum) allow decentralised selection processes
to optimise.14






The algorithm can be described informally
6 as follows:
1.  start with the finest decomposition D
0={{1},{2},{3},.....,{N}}





3.  if no, build a new decomposition D
1 by union of the smallest blocks for which
condition 2 was violated and go back to 2.
3.3 Near-decomposability.
When building a decomposition scheme for a problem in the foregoing “perfect cognition” vein,
one has looked for perfect decomposability, in the sense that one required that all blocks be
optimised in a totally independent way from the others. In this way we are guaranteed to decompose
the problem into perfectly isolated components (in the sense that each of them can be solved
independently). This is indeed very stringent a requirement: even when interdependencies are rather
weak, but diffused across all components, one easily tends to observe problems for which no
decomposition exists. For instance in Kauffman’s NK landscapes, already for small values of K
such as 1 or 2 - that is for highly correlated landscapes -  the algorithm described above finds only
decomposition schemes of size N or just below that value.
Let us soften the requirement of perfect decomposability into one of near-decomposability: one
does not want the problem to be decomposed into completely separated sub-problems, (i.e. sub-
problems which fully contain all interdependencies) but wants sub-problems to contain only the
most “relevant” interdependencies while less relevant ones can persist across sub-problems. In this
way, optimising each sub-problem independently will not necessarily lead to the global optimum,
but to one of the “best” solutions
7. In the rigorous meaning defined below,  one may construct sorts
of “near-decompositions” which give a precise measure of the trade-off between decentralisation
and optimality: higher degree of decentralisation together with higher speed of adaptation, vs. the





N be the set of  the best m configurations.
We say that Xm is reachable from a configuration x and for a decomposition D if there exist at
least one y˛Xm such that y is reachable from x.
We call basin of attraction Y(Xm,D) of Xm  for decomposition D the set of all configurations
from which Xm is reachable.
If Y(Xm,D)=X we say that D is a m-decomposition for the problem.
                                                          
6 The complete algorithm is quite lengthy to describe in exhaustive and precise terms. Its Pascal and C++
implementations are available from the authors upon request.
7 If solutions were not only ordered but a value was attributed to them, we could easily express all the following in terms
of approximations to the global optimum.15
m-decompositions of minimum size can be found algorithmically with a straightforward
generalisation of the above algorithm which computes minimum size decompositions schemes for
optimal decompositions.
The following proposition gives the most important property of minimum size m-decompositions,
namely:
Proposition 3: if Dm is a minimum size m-decomposition, then sz(Dm) is monotonically weakly
decreasing in m.
Proof: cf. Appendix.
The general intuition of this proposition is indeed that higher degrees of decentralisation can be
attained at the price of giving up the search for globally optimal solutions.
3.4 Problem-solving with changing representations.
So far we have supposed that the “structure” of the problem, i.e. the representation of the space
to be searched is exogenously given and cannot be manipulated. But, as already mentioned,
problem-solving does not only involve search in a given space but also – and probably more
important – a re-framing of the problem itself. In this section we put forward a very preliminary
investigation of the properties of problem representations using the toolbox developed in the
previous sections. In particular, we show that changing representations can generally be a more
powerful problem-solving strategy then searching possibilities generated within a given
representation: decentralisation can be increased if more “powerful” representations are built.
One needs some further definitions.
A representation of the problem (X,‡) is a pair (X,￿) where:
X:XﬁL is an encoding of the problem, which maps configurations into words of a language L;
￿ is a preference relation over possible words in such a language.
We assume that L is made of all and only the words (strings) of a fixed length n over a binary
alphabet: L={l; l˛{0,1}
n}. We also assume that the encoding X is a one-to-one mapping, i.e.:
1) X(xi)„ X(xj)     "i„j
2)   $l˛L; l=X(xi)     "xi˛X
The preference relation ￿ is a “subjective” one which does not necessarily coincide with the
“objective” one ‡.16
We further assume, moving somewhat closer to a descriptive theory, that agents do not know the
“objective” problem, but only some imperfect representation of it: this is also defining the space
which is being searched with a given decomposition scheme.
Falling short of any exhaustive exploration of the role of representation dynamics (i.e. ultimately
of the dynamics of cognitive categories and of individual and collective knowledge) we highlight
the paramount role of representation dynamics in problem solving search.
As a preliminary to a much deeper investigation which is still to be undertaken, in the following
we just mention three benchmark propositions which together point to the fact that representations
can be very powerful search tools. This hints to a possible line of inquiry which considers the
construction of shared representations as one of the main functions accomplished by an
organisation.
Proposition 4: every problem (X, ‡) admits a representation (X,￿) and a decomposition scheme
D(X,￿) which can solve it.
Proof: cf. Appendix.
Together, the two propositions which follow, claim instead that the complexity of a problem, its
decomposability and the time required to solve it depend on its representation. In fact, by modifying
the encoding (proposition 5) and/or the preference relation (proposition 6) we can transform any
problem into one of minimum complexity. Considering them together, one is led to the important
conclusion that acting on representations tends to be a more powerful problem-solving strategy than
acting on the solution algorithm for a given representation.
Proposition 5: given any problem (X, ‡), it admits an encoding X such that it can be solved
optimally with the decomposition scheme of minimum complexity D={{1},{2},{3},.....,{N}}.
Proof: cf. Appendix.
Proposition 6: given any problem (X, ‡) and any encoding X, there exist a preference relation ￿
such that it can be solved optimally with the decomposition scheme of minimum complexity
D={{1},{2},{3},.....,{n}}.
Proof: cf. Appendix.
Given the foregoing general properties of problem structures and problem solving, let us put
to work such a formal machinery and illustrate some applications and refinements.17
4. Problem Decomposition and Attainable Solution Patterns: Some Examples
4.1 Decomposability of a simple coordination problem.
Let us consider a coordination problem involving three binary elements. The set of possible
configurations is given by:
X = {x1 , x2, …, xn} with xi = s1, s2, s3 (where "j: sj ˛ {0, 1})
Two different payoffs structures are considered (where, of course, only the ordinal value
matters):
First case









Following the methodology presented above, it can be shown that the problem is not
decomposable. However, if one computes the degree of quasi decomposability of the same problem
according to various “satisficing degrees”, it can be easily shown that an attainable solution emerges
which is accepted that is not the optimal one but allows full decomposability and selects among the
best three Pareto superior solutions (i.e. (4, 4,), (3, 3), (2, 2)) the problem becomes a fully
decomposable one.
Second case18









Indeed the problem can be shown to be decomposable according to the scheme: D={{1},{2,3}}.
The first element’s separability stems from the fact that Nash equilibria for s1=1 are dominant with
respect to the corresponding Nash equilibria for s1=0. This is a sufficient condition for separability,
even if s1=1 is not a dominant strategy.
Also for this case, problem’s decomposability has been computed according to various degrees
of satisficingness. Similarly to the previous case, if we accept that the problem be less that optimally
solved and one of the three best solutions (i.e. (4, 4), (3, 3), 2, 2)) be accepted, then the problem
becomes decomposable (that is: s2 and s3 become separable as well.)
4.2 Competing organisational structures
Of course, the measures of decomposability presented so far ought to be taken as sorts of
theoretical benchmarks which however may not be generally assumed to be known by boundedly
rational agents (actually, finding the minimum size decomposition scheme of a problem is
computationally more complex than solving the problem itself), but we can assume that agents
search adaptively the landscape with conjectural search strategies based on a given hypothesis on
the decomposition of the search space. What are then the evolutionary properties of populations of
agents (organisational structures) which compete on the basis of search strategies based on
conjectural decompositions?
In order to provide some preliminary answers to this questions, we simulated
8 a population of
agents, where each agent is characterised by one out of a limited set of decomposition strategies. We
                                                          
8 All simulations have been developed using the simulation platform called “LSD” (Laboratory for Simulation
Development) (Valente, 1998) which provides a programming environment where simulations can be easily run also by
inexperienced computer users. The interested reader can find downloadable code, user’s manuals, more details of these19
let them compete in an environment defined by some simple rules of selection: worst scoring agents
are removed from the population and replaced with “copies” of the best scoring agents. Copies are
new agents that inherit the parent’s decomposition scheme, but explore the landscape starting from
a different – randomly assigned - point.
Agents start from a random point in the landscape and explore it according to their
individual decomposition scheme. Each agent is defined by a given decomposition of the system
into sub-systems and generates new points by choosing randomly one of the sub-systems, and
mutating its bits (possibly all of them) randomly.
For instance, consider a n agent who follows the decomposition strategy
D={{1,2,3},{4,5,6,},{7,8,9},{10,11,12}}. Thus, the search space is decomposed into four
subspaces of equal size. In order to generate a new point, the agent chooses randomly one of these 4
sub-spaces,  then some (possibly all) of the bits in the chosen schema are mutated. The fitness value
of the new point is observed: if such a fitness is higher than the one of its current position the agent
moves to it, and the latter becomes the new starting point, otherwise the agent remains where it is.
These steps are iterated. Thus, what differentiates agents is only the way they generate new points to
be tested, i.e. their search strategy, which in turn is determined by their decomposition of the search
space.
Of course there is a huge number of possible decompositions, but in order to restrict such a
number
9 we imagine that agents “know” that only some “well-behaved” decompositions are
possible, in particular we imagine that blocks of an admissible decomposition must have all the
same dimension and that they form a partition of the search space. We are thus left with only six
possible decomposition and, correspondingly, six types of agents, named after the dimension of the
sub-problems into which they decompose the problem:
Agent type 1: D={{1},{2},{3},{4},{5},{6},{7},{8},{9}{10},{11},{12}}
Agent type 2: D={{1,2},{3,4},{5,6},{7,8},{9,10},{11,12}}
Agent type 3: D={{1,2,3},{4,5,6},{7,8,9},{10,11,12}}
Agent type 4: D={{1,2,3,4},{5,6,7,8},{9,10,11,12}}
Agent type 6: D={{1,2,3,4,5,6},{7,8,9,10,11,12}}
Agent type 12: D={{1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10,11,12}}
We first checked whether agents whose decomposition perfectly reflects the structure of the
underlying landscape are actually able to find its global optimum irrespectively of the initial
conditions. To test this hypothesis we built five kinds of random landscapes with a given structure,
determined by the following minimum size decomposition schemes:
                                                                                                                                                                                                
and other simulations and programs to run simulations with different parameters and settings at the site:
http://www.business.auc.dk/~mv/Lsd1.1/Intro.html
9 As we want to study the evolutionary properties of optimal decompositions, we have to compare them with some
“reasonable” ones, this is the reason why we restrict so much the number of possible decompositions.20
Landscape type 1: D={{1},{2},{3},{4},{5},{6},{7},{8},{9}{10},{11},{12}}
Landscape type 2: D={{1,2},{3,4},{5,6},{7,8},{9,10},{11,12}}
Landscape type 3: D={{1,2,3},{4,5,6},{7,8,9},{10,11,12}}
Landscape type 4: D={{1,2,3,4},{5,6,7,8},{9,10,11,12}}
Landscape type 6: D={{1,2,3,4,5,6},{7,8,9,10,11,12}}
Landscape type 12: D={{1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10,11,12}}
For each type of landscape we let 180 artificial agents, 30 for each type, evolve without any
selection. Agents are initialized at a random point of the landscape, and then they pursue their
search strategy as described above (i.e. they choose one sub-problem and mutate randomly at least
one bit in it). To avoid the effect of lucky initial conditions (of course any agent can find the global
optimum if it starts “close” enough to it) we periodically “shake” the population: when fitness
values have settled, we reposition all existing agents in randomly chosen points, from which they
have to start again their search.
In figure 1 we report the average fitness values for each class on a landscape of type 4.21
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Average fitness values of each class are always non-decreasing (because agents either increase
their fitness or stay put) except the sudden drops they incur every 1000 iterations, when agents are
randomly repositioned. Note that the average fitness of agents of types 1, 2 and 3 quickly stops
growing, because all agents in those classes become locked in local optima (some of them may
actually reach the global optimum if their starting point is close enough to it, but this effect tends to
be cancelled out by the periodic repositioning of agents). All agents in class 4 increase quickly their
fitness and set on the global maximum. Agents in class 6 grow less quickly than agents in the lower
classes; moreover they cannot all reach the global optimum, since some of them are trapped in local
optima. This is because at each mutation they can indeed jump on a wider range, but their
decomposition does not allow to identify with certainty the global maximum. Agents in class 12 use
a purely random search, having the possibility to jump on every point at each mutation. This allows
them to grow slowly but steadily, and in the end all agents in this class may also be able to find the
global maximum. However this strategy is extremely slow, and is clearly outperformed, in speed of
convergence, by the one used by agents of class 4.
Equivalent results have been found for landscapes of types 2, 3, 6 and 12. In all exercises one
observes the same property: strategies using decompositions not including the one corresponding to
the minimum size decomposition scheme are bound to be trapped in local optima. Strategies using
decompositions which include the minimum one but are bigger do always reach the global optimum
but do so slowly. Search strategies corresponding to the minimum decomposition scheme clearly
outperform every other strategy.
However, it is remarkable that correct decomposition strategies might not always prevail when
nested in competitive environments characterised by some form of selection. In fact, while they are
able to always locate the global optimum with certainty, the time required might be so long that they
are actually eliminated by the selection mechanism. In order to test this proposition, we ran a set of
simulations in a set-up very similar to the above one (180 agents, 30 for each strategy initially
located in points of the landscape randomly chosen) however agents are not “re-positioned”.
Moreover, every 10 mutations they are ranked according to their fitness: the 30 worst scoring agents
are eliminated from the population and replaced by copies of 30 agents chosen among the surviving
ones.
Figure 2 shows the average number of copies over 10 different simulation runs on each of the
landscapes considered (the averages are meant to avoid possible influences of particular initial
conditions).23
Figure 2: Average Number of Agents per Class
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As it might have been expected, for landscapes of types 2, 3, 4 and 6, agents whose
decomposition perfectly reproduce the structure of the landscape tend to dominate the population.
On the contrary, on landscapes of size 12 this does not happen, as agents of type 12, in spite of
being the only ones always able to find the global optimum, are displaced by “simpler” strategies
which tend be locked into local optima, but reach them relatively quickly.
Finally, we have considered a population of agents competing in the exploration of a landscape
whose structure, defined in terms of decomposability, is given but is however “deformed” at regular
time intervals. This means that, even if the structure of the landscape stays basically the same, the
position of peaks can change.
Again, we consider a population of 180 agents evolving according to the same adaptation and
selection rules described above.
Our results show very robustly that as the frequency of landscape’s deformation increases, the
population tends to be dominated by agents whose decomposition degree is smaller. In the limit,
even in the case of totally decomposable landscapes, the population is rapidly dominated by non-
decomposing agents.
4.3 Increasing Returns to Specialization24
We have already emphasized that the formal framework presented here is well suited to capture
some general problem-solving properties of alternative patterns of division of labour. A
straightforward refinement entails the introduction of some form of Smithian increasing returns to
specialization.
In order to do that, let us consider a class of coordination problems whose elements are in the set
S={s1,s2,…,s12} and whose configuration set is  X={x1,x2,…,x4096} with, as usual, x i=s1s2….s12
where s j˛{0,1}. Alike the foregoing exercises, we consider a population of 180 agents, evenly
distributed among the same 6 types and evolving according to the same death and birth process. In
addition, we model increasing returns to specialization by assuming that when an agent finds itself
located on a local optimum relative to its decomposition, the value of that optimum itself increases
at a rate q that is inversely proportional to the dimension of the adopted decomposition. It follows
that type 1 agents (i.e. those which tend to decompose more)  are subject to lock in effects on
suboptimal peaks. In other words, as  q increases, those agents with a greater attitude towards
decomposition tend to dominate the whole population (no matter the problem’s decomposability
degree.)
Simulations show that as the rate q increases, even for problems characterized by low levels of
decomposability, the population tends to be more and more dominated by agents which employ
search heuristics founded on high levels of decompositions.
With respect to these results, our conjecture is however that the key factor in inducing increasing
returns to specialization is to be explained in terms of the absence of “necessary” limits to the
division and specialization process. In other words, we can imagine a division of labour process as a
tree diagram of unbounded depth in which, say, nodes at level i can be reached only after parents
nodes at level i-1 have been reached. The main point is thus not quite that of improving efficiency in
accomplishing those tasks associated with a single node, but rather that of increasing the depth and
width of the division of labour by progressively sub-dividing tasks. However the methodology
presented here is unable to capture these aspects as it assumes a lower bound to the division of
labour (our constituent components) which cannot be further subdivided.
4.4 Partial Representations and Collective Problem-solving
A different set of preliminary simulations considers instead a population of agents who hold only
a partial representation of the overall problem, in the sense that they control only a limited number
of elements involved.
Let us consider again the usual 12-dimensional problem. That is:  S={x1,x2,…,x12},
X={x1,x2,…,x4096} with, as usual, xi=s1s2….s12  where sj˛{0,1}.
We let I={1,2,3..,12} be the index set. Every agent Aj is defined by a subset of the index set Aj˝I
and it is characterized by a dimension | Aj| (that denotes the agent’s “perspective”, i.e. the (limited)
number of dimensions it controls.)25
The decomposition methodology defined above allows the definition of:
1.  the optimal structure (i.e. that which minimizes agents’ dimension) that permits
parallel solution;
2.  the optimal structure that permits sequential solution (“simpler” than the previous
one when blocks forming the decomposition are overlapping).
We have thus carried out simulations of random organisations. That is, a configuration is
randomly selected and an agent is then randomly chosen that, restricted to its controlled dimensions,
makes some mutations thus generating a new configuration. Should this new configuration be fitter
than the starting one this is assumed as a new starting configuration. Iterating this kind of procedure,
a problem space can be explored not only in terms of different decomposition strategies but in terms
of different “cognitive” (i.e. relative to complexity and competencies) perspectives as well.
Our preliminary results show that agents characterised by coarser decompositions get bigger
average payoffs, as they have lower probabilities of being locked into local optima, as they have the
possibility of moving through ampler steps.
5. Heuristics and decomposability in individual and collective problem-
solving: some conclusions and directions for further research.
This paper is our first building block of a research project which tries to achieve a better
understanding of organisations as ‘collective, imperfect, inferential machines’ to extend a definition
that one of us used earlier in connection with individual judgements and decisions (Legrenzi,
Girotto and Johnson Laird (1994)).
In this work we have suggested that organisations – through their very structure – implement
collective mechanisms which perform complex inferential tasks by combining simple individual
heuristics. In particular we have shown how the division of labour determines which collective
solutions are generated and tested on the grounds of simple individuals trial-and-error search
heuristics. We may thus interpret our results as a step towards a better understanding of the relations
that bind together the cognitive and the governance roles of organizational routines.
More specifically, in our perspective diverse organizational forms map into diverse a) problem
representations, b) problem decompositions, c) task assignment, d) heuristics for and boundaries to
exploration and learning, e) mechanisms for conflict resolution over interests but also over
alternative cognitive frames and problem interpretations. With respect to these dimensions, one
might think, at one extreme, of an archetype involving complete, hierarchical representations,
precise task assignment, quite tight boundaries to exploration and, if all that works, no need for ex-26
post conflict resolution. The opposite extreme archetype might be somewhat akin a university
departments, with a number of representations at least as high as the number of individuals, fuzzy
decompositions and conflict resolution rules, little task assignments and loose boundaries to
exploration (more on this in Dosi, Hobday and Marengo (2000)). The formal apparatus suggested
above allows indeed a quite general account of the problem-solving properties of different structural
forms and the diverse instantiations they entail of the fundamental tradeoffs between
decentralization, search costs and “quality” of the ensuing solutions.
More speculatively, let us conclude by suggesting some possible deeper isomorphisms in
structures of problem-solving knowledge, inferential mechanisms and learning, which goes well
beyond the acknowledgement that organisations rather than curbing individual decision biases tend
indeed to amplify them (for discussions, cf. March (1994) and Dosi and Lovallo (1995)). Even at a
superficial look one finds strong similarities between concepts used here and elsewhere with
reference to organisational analysis and those used in relation to individual cognition and problem-
solving (cf. Legrenzi and Girotto (1996)). For example, the notions of ‘problem-restructuring’
inherited from gestalt psychology is highly germane to the idea developed above that different
‘decomposition’ of a problem entail different ‘divisions of labour’ in the search space. Or, another
example is the similarity one finds between ‘routine expertise’ in the literature on ‘expert
knowledge’ (Holyoak and Spellman (1993)) and routines without further qualification in
organisational analysis (Nelson and Winter (1982), Cohen  et al. (1995)). Needless to say, the
fundamental task is to go beyond sheer analogy and explore, via both formal explorations and
experimental exercises, what insights can be gained for the analysis of organisations as systems of
distributed, but relatively structured, evolving, problem-solving knowledge.
In particular, we submit the conjecture that there is much more than a metaphorical analogy
between problem-decomposition in collective organisations and decompositions and other heuristics
they typically employ in their cognitive endeavours. At a formal level, decompositions are a
particular kind of search heuristics, that is sets of rules for search that limit the space of
configurations to be generated and tested. In these abstract terms, decompositions and heuristics
have the very same function: that of reducing the size of the search space. Actually, we can imagine
an agent who does not explicitly decompose the search space, but who has a very “powerful” (i.e.
effective) heuristic that can reduce, to a significant degree, the space of configurations to be tested,
for instance by drawing powerful inferences from the already tested solutions. The space can be
possibly reduced to one whose magnitude is similar to that of an agent capable of full
decomposition. In other words, a decomposition is, after all, nothing but a particular instance of
heuristic.27
At least equally interestingly, there is a striking similarity between problem-decomposition we
have formalised so far and the experimental evidence from cognitive psychology on the ‘naive’
problem-solving heuristics which individuals typically display
10.
Finally note that, as argued at the beginning, on purpose we meant to explore as a first
approximation a conflict-free, incentive-free fiction of organisations, in order to focus precisely on
their knowledge dimension. However, the formal machinery presented here allows fruitful links
with those other neglected dimensions. In particular, as already hinted above particular knowledge
decomposition easily relates with credit assignment decomposition of organisational structures (i.e.,
roughly speaking, who should be blamed or rewarded for what) and by the same token, with issues
of incentives, control and power over tasks assignments..
But, of course, all this is well beyond the foregoing, highly preliminary, work, largely aimed at
presenting some basic building-blocks of a ‘constructive’ theory of organisations as repositories of
knowledge.
                                                          
10 For instance the so-called “conservative focussing” heuristic, which has been shown to be the typical heuristic in
concept formation (cf. Bruner, Goodnow and Austin (1956)), is nothing but a full decomposition of the search space.
Actually, experimental evidence shows that “concepts” which are highly decomposable are “easy” to apprehend by
human subject, while concepts which are not decomposable are much more difficult and usually human subjects fail to
discover them.28
Appendix – Proofs of Propositions
In this appendix we provide the proofs of the propositions in the text, reported from Marengo
(1999).
Proof of Proposition 1: by hypothesis x
i belongs to the basin of attraction Y(x
0,D) of x
0. Let us
order all the configurations in Y(x









1 then, by definition, x
0 must be a best-neighbour of x
i. If x
i=x
2 then either x 0 is a best
neighbour of x
i or is not. In the latter case x
1 must necessarily be a best-neighbour of x
i. And so on
by induction…
Proof of Proposition 2: If i=1 x
0 is trivially reachable from x
0 itself for all decompositions,
including the finest D={{1},{2},{3},.....,{N}}.
Proof of Proposition 3: if m=2
N then Xm includes all configurations and it is trivially reachable for
any decomposition, including the finest Dm={{1},{2},{3},.....,{N}} with sz=1. If m=1 Xm includes
only the global optimum, thus the size of the minimum size decomposition is 1£sz(D1)£N. We still
have to show that it cannot be sz(Dm+1)>sz(Dm): if this was the case Xm could not be reached from
Xm+1 for decomposition D m, but this contradicts the assumption that  Xm is reachable from any
configuration in X for decomposition Dm
Proof of Proposition 4: given that we are considering finite problems, this proposition is trivial.
Consider in fact a representation (X,￿) where X is completely free and ￿ has the only constraint of
preserving the same global maximum of the fitness function. Clearly the decomposition scheme
D={{1,2,3,....., n}} will find such a global maximum in 2
n steps.
Proof of Proposition 5: we prove the proposition by constructing an encoding which has such a
property for a generic problem.
Consider a mapping F:XﬁN from the possible solution into the set of non-negative integers such
as:
F(x0)=0, F(x1)=1,.........., F( x n 2 )=2
n
where  x n 2 ‡….‡x1‡x0
Define now the encoding X*(xi)=bin(F(xi)) where bin is a function which maps an integer into
its binary encoding. It is now very easy to verify, because of the properties of binary encoding, that
X* is an encoding which satisfies proposition 2.29
Proof of Proposition 6: we prove also this proposition by construction. Let us call x* the point
corresponding to the global maximum of the fitness function, and let X(x*)=l* be its representation,
with  l l l ln
* * * * ..... = 1 2
Any preference relation such that    n i l l l l ... ....
*
2 1 ￿ n i l l l l ... .... 2 1       n i l l i i ,......, 2 , 1      
* = „ "
satisfies proposition 9.
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